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Abstract 
 
This study analyzes the effects of managerial ownership on the risk-taking 
behavior of Korean and Japanese banks during the relatively regulated period of the late 
1990s to the early 2000s. It finds that managerial ownership alone does not affect either 
the risk or the profit levels of Korean banks. In contrast, an increase in managerial 
ownership adds to the total risk of Japanese banks. However, increased risk-taking 
behavior does not produce higher levels of profit for Japanese banks. The coefficients of 
the interaction term between franchise value and managerial ownership are negative and 
statistically significant for both the Korean and the Japanese banking industries. This 
means that an increase in managerial ownership at banks with high franchise values 
discourages risk-taking behavior. The result confirms the disciplinary role of franchise 
value on the risk-taking behavior of banks. It also falls in line with previous literature 
supporting the moral hazard hypothesis based on research into the economies of the U.S. 
and other countries. 
 
JEL Classifications: G20, G21 G32 
Keywords: Bank ownership structure, managerial ownership, moral hazard, 
franchise value, risk-taking behavior 
I. Introduction 
 
Limited liability allows shareholders to keep all upside gains while sharing their 
losses with bondholders. Shareholders, therefore, have a strong incentive to increase risk. 
Bondholders, particularly depositors, also have weak incentives to monitor and limit such 
risk-taking behavior because they are shielded from its consequences by the financial 
safety net of limited liability. This leads to the moral hazard problem associated with 
deposit insurance. The monitoring function, therefore, falls on regulators, including 
deposit insurers. 
However, many studies suggest that the incentives of bank managers may differ 
from those of external stockholders. If the managers largely invest in non-diversifiable 
(i.e., firm-specific) human capital, and managers of failed firms have difficulty finding 
comparable jobs due to a reputation for incompetence, they may act in a risk-averse 
rather than in a value-maximizing manner in order to keep their jobs (Berle and Means, 
1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This stockholder-manager agency conflict may help 
offset the moral hazard problem by aligning the interests of risk-averse bank managers 
with those of bank regulators. 
Nevertheless, the conflict between stockholders and managers can be mitigated if 
the managers’ interests are aligned with those of external stockholders. This can arise 
through insider ownership, which can be created when bank managers are compensated 
with stock or stock options, and are thus granted ownership of shares. While numerous 
studies have documented an inverse relationship between risk-taking by non-bank firms 
and managerial control, the conflict of interest is more complicated in the banking sector. 
This is because of the presence of bank regulators, who by their actions set the rules and 
regulations regarding risk-taking by banks. Less regulated environments can exacerbate 
stockholder-manager conflict over levels of risk-taking. Such conditions occur when, for 
example, business activities and interest rates are deregulated, or when closure rules are 
not strictly enforced. Deregulated environments give bank stockholders greater incentives 
and abilities to increase risk than tightly regulated ones do. In addition, ownership 
structure is expected to have a much stronger effect on the levels of risk taken by banks 
during periods of deregulation than during periods of regulation. 
Franchise value—the present value of a firm’s future economic profit as a going 
concern—also works to reduce the risk-taking incentives of banks. This is because banks 
with high franchise values have much to lose if a risky business strategy leads to 
insolvency. Therefore, franchise value helps to mitigate the moral hazard problem 
associated with the safety net. Keeley (1990) claims that the decline in franchise value of 
the US banks in the 1960s and 1970s can explain the increase in their risk-taking 
behavior in the 1980s. 
This paper examines the relationship between the ownership structure and risk- 
taking behavior of banks in Korea and Japan during the relatively regulated period of the 
late 1990s through the mid-2000s. The literature about the effect of managerial ownership 
on the risk-taking behavior of banks is mainly based upon U.S. banking experiences of 
the 1980s. Moreover, it differs on the exact relationship between ownership structure and 
risk-taking. Therefore, an examination of the relationship between ownership structure 
and the risk-taking of banks in Korea and Japan could provide better insight into the issue.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Following the introduction, Section II 
describes the backgrounds of the financial industries in Korea and Japan. Section III 
reviews the literature on the relationship between the ownership structure and risk-taking 
behavior of banks. Section IV investigates the empirical model and explains the data 
employed in this research. Section V presents the results of the empirical estimations, 
while Section VI concludes the study. 
 
II. The Backgrounds of the Financial Industries in Korea and Japan 
 
This paper examines the relatively regulated periods of 1997 to 2005 for Korea, 
and of 1996 to 2006 for Japan. In both countries, the industrial organization of the 
banking sector was gradually changed in the late 1980s and dramatically reformed in the 
1990s. Triggered by the bankruptcy of the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust 
Company, a major U.S. commercial bank, new international guidelines for commercial 
banks were introduced under the supervision of the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). Commercial banks in Korea and Japan had to comply with these new guidelines, 
which began to influence their ownership structure in the late 1980s. In 1990, domestic 
financial authorities reflected the above international banking supervisions, thereby 
further promoting the structural change of the Korean and Japanese banking industries in 
the decade that followed. 
Until the mid-1990s, the governments of Korea and Japan intervened heavily in 
the management of banks through measures such as credit allocation and the appointment 
of bank CEOs. In those years, neither ownership structure nor franchise value was related 
to the risk-taking behavior of individual banks. This was especially true in Japan, which 
introduced what is commonly dubbed as the financial convoy system.1 In Korea, too, the 
government placed heavy impositions on bank management, although to a lesser extent. 
Under these financially repressed circumstances, the levels of risk taken by banks were 
not reflected in their balance sheets, nor were differentiating strategies even necessary. 
However, the governments began to promote financial liberalization and 
deregulation in the mid-1990s in order to enhance the competitiveness of their respective 
banking industries. They deregulated interest rates and permitted new banks to enter the 
market while implicitly protecting banks so that they would survive. As a result, 
competition grew intense and banks engaged in aggressive risk-taking behavior, which 
combined with governmental forbearance from bank closure to become one of the main 
causes of the 1997 financial crisis as experienced in Korea, and of the prolonged 
sluggishness of the Japanese banking sector. 
 
The Korean Banking Industry 
The 1988 BIS capital standard was introduced to the Korean banking industry in 
1992, but was not implemented until 1996. Following the 1997 financial crisis, BIS 
capital standards were further tightened. Lee (2000) studied the relationship between risk-
taking and capital regulation in the Korean banking sector during the 1990s, and finds 
that capital and risk levels are positively related. In addition, Chun and Lee (2000) look at 
the effects of strict capital regulation at the end of the 1997 financial crisis, and find that 
it forced commercial banks to reduce their ownership of risky assets. This led to the so-
called credit crunch, which worsened the economic recession caused by the financial 
crisis (Chun and Lee, 2000). 
The Korean banking sector underwent comprehensive financial restructuring 
after the 1997 financial crisis. At the end of 1997, supervisory bodies were consolidated 
into a controlling agent, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), and BIS capital 
regulations were tightly enforced. In 1998, accounting standards were strengthened with 
the classification rule for non-performing loans aligned to the best international practices. 
Forward-looking criteria were also employed. Further, Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) 
was used to restructure individual financial institutions. When the first round of financial 
restructuring was completed in the context of a stabilized financial market at the end of 
1999, a partial deposit insurance guarantee system was introduced. This was meant to 
alleviate the moral hazard problem associated with the deposit insurance system, and to 
introduce market discipline in the banking sector. 
The financial restructuring of the banking sector resulted in bank mergers that 
significantly reduced the number of Korean banks from 26 in 1997 to thirteen in 2005. 
The first bank merger wave hit Korea during the period of 1997 to 2001, when the 
government launched financial structural reforms as a way of stabilizing the domestic 
banking system. Conversely, the second wave occurred in late 2001, when individual 
commercial banks sought to strengthen their competitiveness within the market.2 As the 
reforms progressed, the banking sector became heavily concentrated. This development 
has helped to enhance the franchise value of banks (Lee and Nagano, 2008). 
 
The Japanese Banking Industry 
In Japan, financial liberalization was initially introduced in 1979, and was 
strongly encouraged by the government and the new trend of international regulation 
imposed by the BIS during the first half of the 1990s. Consequently, the Japanese 
banking sector experienced dramatic structural change in the 1990s. Financial 
liberalization was generally complete when the time deposit interest rate was deregulated 
in 1994. During the first 1990s, the entire commercial banking sector performed quite 
soundly, while some non-bank firms declared insolvency. 
Between 1996 and 1998, during the Hashimoto administration, the Japanese 
government conducted another comprehensive round of financial reforms, which is 
known as the Japanese Big Bang. They made it possible to establish financial holding 
firms without obtaining prior approval from the financial authorities, and sanctioned 
regulatory changes that liberalized market entry requirements. Following the ratification 
of these measures, Japanese banks established holding firms and consolidated the 
subsidiaries of trust banks, securities companies, and asset management businesses under 
these holding companies. 
During this period, Japan experienced the bankruptcies of two major banks, the 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and the Japan Long-Term Credit Bank. In response to 
banking sector turmoil, the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) was established in 1998 
to accede to the supervisory role previously spread across the Ministry of Finance and the 
Bank of Japan. The FSA introduced new criteria for the assessment of banking assets, 
which caused increases in the Non-performing Loans (NPL) ratios of banks. Moreover, 
tightened fiscal policy under the Koizumi administration dragged down the growth of the 
Japanese economy. 
Between 1998 and 2006, there were fourteen bank mergers, three major corporate 
reorganizations, and four transfers of business operations from bankrupt banks.3  The 
bank merger wave resulted in significant structural changes in the deposit and lending 
markets, which became remarkably concentrated during this period. While competition 
increased in metropolitan areas, the banking sector remained oligopolistic in local cities. 
These differing degrees of ownership concentration across metropolitan areas and local 
cities have resulted in varying bank franchise values. 
 
III. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
(a) Earlier Research on the Relationship between Franchise Value and 
Ownership Structure 
Earlier research has separately examined the disciplinary role of franchise value 
and the effect of ownership structure on bank risk. Franchise value can help to lessen the 
moral hazard problem by increasing the incentives of banks to operate safely, thereby 
aligning their interests with those of deposit insurers and bank supervisors. Keeley (1990) 
documents the decline in U.S. bank franchise value during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, 
when the country’s banking industry experienced deregulation and faced increased 
competition from non-bank financial institutions. He argues that the drop in franchise 
value led to increased risk-taking and heightened rates of insolvency in the 1980s. 
Galloway, Lee, and Roden (1997) also find that bank holding companies (BHCs) with 
higher franchise values consistently undertook lower levels of risk between 1977 and 
1994, while BHCs with lower franchise values engaged in greater risks for most of the 
years within this period. Banking literature presents evidence that managerial 
shareholding is an important determinant of bank risk-taking, but empirical results in this 
sphere are mixed because they depend on the different measures of bank risks used and 
the different regulatory environments considered. Accordingly, there is no consensus on 
the exact form of the relationship between bank risk and managerial ownership. 
 
(b) Regulatory Conditions and Risk-taking Behavior 
The following research contrasts sample periods representing the deregulated 
and the regulated periods of banking supervision. They reveal that bank risk and 
managerial ownership were positively correlated during the deregulated period, but 
negatively or insignificantly related during the regulated period. Saunders, Strock, and 
Travlos (1990) impose linearity on the relationship between the two factors in their study 
of large banks, which lasted from 1978 to 1985. Their conclusion for the 1979 to 1982 
period of deregulation is that stockholder-controlled banks (banks whose managers hold a 
relatively large proportion of stock) exhibited significantly higher risk-taking behavior 
than manager-controlled banks did (these banks being those whose managers hold a 
relatively small proportion of stock). 
Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (1998) reexamine the agency problem posed by 
managerial ownership during the relatively regulated sample period of the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s. They find that the extent of managerial ownership is inversely related to 
the various measures of depository institution risk. Further, Chen, Steiner, and Whyte 
(1998) provide evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship between risk-taking and 
managerial ownership. Cebenoyan et al. (1995) find that, in 1988, savings and loan 
associations (S&Ls) with high levels of managerial ownership engaged in greater risks 
than S&Ls with lower levels of managerial ownership. This is in the context of a year 
that is widely regarded as a time of regulatory leniency and forbearance (Cebenoyan et al., 
1995). In contrast, S&Ls with high levels of managerial ownership assumed lower levels 
of risk in 1991, a year of regulatory stringency and non-forbearance (Cebenoyan et al., 
1995). Further, Kole and Lehn (1999), Anderson and Fraser (2000), and Konishi and 
Yasuda (2004) have examined the relationship between banks’ risk-taking behaviors and 
ownership structure before and after the regulatory changes. 
 
(c) Internal Governance and Risk-taking Behavior 
Existing literature also shows that internal control is related to the risk-taking 
behavior. Gorton and Rosen (1995) use a corporate control approach to explain increased 
risk-taking behavior by banks in the 1980s. In a banking environment with few good 
investment opportunities, poor corporate control mechanisms, and information 
asymmetries that allowed managers to control banks, bad managers engage in more, but 
ultimately unprofitable, risks in order to convince external stockholders that they are 
good managers taking on good risks. Under the corporate control hypothesis, banks with 
entrenched managers who own small amounts of stock will engage in unprofitable risk-
taking. However, managers who possess large stockholdings, and who have hence placed 
considerable personal wealth at stake, will attempt to take on only profitable risks. 
Gorton and Rosen (1995) find that in 1984–1990, BHCs with high levels of managerial 
stock ownership acquired lower credit risk while those with low levels of ownership 
exhibited entrenchment effects. This finding is consistent with the corporate control 
hypothesis. 
 
(d) Franchise Value and Ownership Structure in Banks and Non-financial Firms 
Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1997) argue that franchise value and 
managerial ownership should be treated as independent variables in an examination of 
risk-taking behavior. Risk aversion on the part of managers may counteract the risk 
preferences of owners, thus offsetting the moral hazard problem. In addition, the interests 
of owners and managers would be aligned at banks with high franchise values, though 
not at banks with low franchise values. Previous studies have indicated the relationship 
between franchise value and ownership structure in both non-financial firms (see e.g., 
Demsetz and Lehn [1985]; Mork, Shleifer, and Vishny [1988]) and in banks (see e.g., 
DeYoung, Spong, and Sullivan [1996]; Booth, Cornet, and Tehranian [2002]; Gonzalez 
[2005]). Franchise value is inversely related to risk-taking, even after controlling for 
ownership structure (insider holdings and large block holdings). According to Anderson 
and Fraser (2000), managerial shareholdings were positively related to total and firm-
specific risk in the late 1980s, when banking was relatively less regulated and under 
considerable financial stress. However, this relationship turned negative in the early 
1990s because legislation designed to reduce risk-taking was enacted in 1989 and 1991. 
 
(e) Study Hypotheses and Literature on Korean and Japanese Banks 
Few surveys have explicitly examined the agency problem in either the Korean 
or the Japanese banking industries. According to research published between the years of 
1994 to 2000 (Lee, 2004, 2005-2006), bank managers in positions of greater moral 
hazard tend to have more incentive to align their interests with those of stockholders. 
They take on more risks and higher levels of managerial ownership when compared with 
those in positions of lesser moral hazard. However, this relationship only held over the 
relatively deregulated period of 1994 to 1997. Konishi and Yasuda (2004) examine the 
risk-taking activities of Japanese banks during 1990 to 1999, and find that shareholder 
ownership had a nonlinear relationship with risk, and that declines in franchise value 
increased the taking of risks. 
Literature surveying the risk-taking behavior of banks in the Korean or the 
Japanese banking sector only examines the 1990s, and neglects to explore the interaction 
between franchise value and managerial ownership. In contrast, this paper focuses on the 
relatively regulated period of the late 1990s and the early 2000s, and examines the 
disciplinary role of franchise value by taking account of the interaction between franchise 
value and managerial ownership. In doing so, it tests the moral hazard hypothesis, and 
obtains insights on the agency problem and the disciplinary role of franchise value in 
periods of relative financial stability in Korea and Japan. It also investigates whether risk-
taking behavior resulting from increased levels of managerial ownership leads to higher 
profits. 
 
IV. Empirical Model and Data 
 
1. Model 
We use the panel estimation model, which combines data for various commercial 
banks over the sample periods in equation (1), to examine the relations among risk, 
ownership structure, and franchise value for banks in Korea and Japan. Following 
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990), we assume that, at least in the short term, 
managing performance can be viewed as an endogenous decision variable, which is 
affected by ownership structure, franchise value, and other control variables.4 
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We capture the differences in cross-sectional bank units by specifying an intercept 
coefficient for each cross-sectional unit in the panel model, and estimate the difference in 
intercepts using dummy variables. This is a fixed effects model because the regression 
line is raised or lowered by a fixed amount for each individual. However, individual 
difference can also be treated as random disturbance drawn from specified distribution in 
a random effects model, in which case, it becomes part of the model’s disturbance term 
(Judge et al., 1988; Baltagi, 2008). 
The method of ordinary least squares is the best unbiased linear estimator for 
fixed effects models, and the method of generalized least squares is the best unbiased 
linear estimator for random effects models. Random effects models require no correlation 
between the regressors and the individual attributes represented by intercept coefficients. 
The Hausman specification test was employed to choose between the fixed effects model 
and the random effects model, and its rejection of the null hypothesis suggested that the 
random effects model was not appropriate and that the fixed effect models should be 
employed (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). 
jtRisk  in equation (1) represents bank j’s risk in time t. As in Chen, Steiner, and 
Whyte (1998), we use the two-index model to generate risk measures. The two-index 
model is represented as follows: 
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Here, jtR  represents the return on the stock of the 
thj  bank at time t. MKtR  
designates the market index (either the Korea Composite Stock Price Index [KOSPI] or 
the Tokyo Stock Price Index [TOPIX]) at time t. sINtR  denotes the short-term interest rate 
series indicated by daily changes in yield on 30-day Treasury bills, and jte  represents 
random error terms.
 
Various risk measures can be derived from the above two-index model. Total risk 
sσ  is measured as the standard deviation of weekly returns on each bank’s stock. 
Unsystematic risk sεσ  is measured as the standard deviation of residual error terms from 
the model. Systematic risk is represented by sMKβ , the coefficient of market portfolio 
returns, or market beta. 
These measures are employed because management can affect both systematic 
and unsystematic risks, given that banks are simply portfolios of primary financial assets. 
For example, a bank investing heavily in Treasury securities would be relatively low-risk 
and have a low market beta. Thus, systematic risk can be influenced by management 
decisions. Banks may also find it difficult to diversify unsystematic risk if lending is 
concentrated in certain regions or on certain products. 
jtInside  refers to the percentage of equity held by managers and directors at the 
thj bank at time t. For Japanese banks, jtInside  refers to the portion of equity owned by 
stable shareholders (those who do not engage in short-term stock trading, including 
directors, managers, and banks as organizations). It is generally believed that Japanese 
firms are controlled by stable shareholders (Kang et al., 1999). This is expected to have 
potentially the same effects on risk-taking as managerial ownership does in the U.S. 
2
jtInside , the square of jtInside , allows for the possibility of a nonlinear relationship 
between managerial ownership and risk-taking behavior. This is to accommodate the 
observations of McConnell and Servaes (1990), Gorton and Rosen (1995), and 
Cebenoyan et al. (1999). The corporate control hypothesis predicts a significant positive 
coefficient for jtInside , and a significant negative coefficient for 2jtInside .
 
The monitoring of managerial risk-taking could be affected by the structure of 
ownership as well as by the regulatory structure. We include jtOutside as a proxy for the 
structure of ownership. jtOutside  is measured as the percentage of shares held by 
external block holders.5 The information asymmetry hypothesis (Ross [1989]; Zeckhause 
and Pound [1990]) predicts that the opaque nature of banking gives external stockholders, 
including institutional investors, little control over bank managers. This hypothesis 
anticipates that the coefficient for jtOutside  will be insignificant. Conversely, Pound’s 
(1988) prudent man hypothesis predicts the opposite. According to this hypothesis, 
institutional investors as large block holders have greater expertise, resources, and 
incentives for monitoring bank management, and are less subject to the information 
asymmetries suffered by other stockholders. Therefore, the prudent man hypothesis 
envisions that jtOutside  will have a negative relationship with the risk measures and a 
positive one with profitability. 
jtOutside may represent concentrated ownership, which is often used to identify 
shareholder monitoring. The literature has used interesting ways to investigate the 
relationship among ownership concentration, firm risks, and regulation. Under the 
substitution hypothesis, owners are more active when there is less regulation. Gonzalez 
(2005) and Kim et al. (2007) conduct extensive reviews on the literature about the 
substitution hypothesis. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 
(1998), and Holderness, Kroszer, and Sheehan (1999) find a positive relation between 
ownership concentration and firm risk. Kim et al. (2007) suggest that this is indicative of 
monitoring by large shareholders. Anderson and Fraser (2000) and Konishi and Yasuda 
(2004) find that risk-taking by shareholders commonly increases during less regulated 
periods while decreasing during periods of stringent regulation.6 
1−jtQ  represents the franchise value of bank j at time t-1. In order to take account 
of the fact that risk-taking behavior is affected by the previous year’s franchise value 
rather than by the current one, franchise value was lagged. Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio 
of the market value of a firm to the replacement costs of its assets, is an attractive 
theoretical measure with which to determine franchise value.7 Following Keeley’s (1990) 
technique for deriving a proxy for franchise value, we used a simple estimator of q, the 
sum of the market value of common equity (price per share times number of shares) plus 
the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets. 
To examine the interaction between managerial stock ownership and franchise 
value, we added the slope interaction variable jtjt InsideQratio *1− . The coefficient indicates 
whether managerial ownership has an encouraging or depressing effect on risk as the 
franchise value of a bank increases. Negative and significant coefficients imply that an 
increase in managerial ownership at banks with high franchise value discourages risk-
taking activity, which supports the hypothesis that franchise value plays a disciplinary 
role in regulating risk-taking by banks. 
We used three control variables in the model: jtLTA , jtCAP , and jtFA . jtLTA , 
the log of the total assets of the thj bank at time t, should have an offsetting effect on 
risk-taking because large banks tend to hold more diversified asset portfolios, resulting in 
lower levels of risk. Nevertheless, the implicit guarantee provided by the government for 
large banks through endorsement of the “too big to fail” notion may encourage banks to 
take more risks. jtCAP , the capital-to-asset ratio (shareholder equity as a proportion of 
total assets) of the thj bank at time t, represents financial leverage and should be 
negatively related to the risk measures. As the capital-to-asset ratio of an institution rises, 
its level of risk is expected to fall. 
Although we chose the capital-to-asset ratio to signify financial leverage, the 
equity-to-asset ratio is also one of the most commonly used proxies for bank risk. When 
equity levels are low, bank risk is high; this is because capital represents collateral 
against liabilities and protects banks from insolvency when asset values decline (Pringle, 
1974; Santomero and Watson, 1977; Taggart and Greenbaum, 1978; Buser, Chen, and 
Kane, 1981; Marcus, 1983; Houston and James, 1995). Conservative owners or managers 
will maintain high levels of capital. Further, Barth, Bartholomew, and Bradley (1990); 
Cebenoyan, Coperman, and Register (1995); Gibson (1995); and Knopf and Teall (1996) 
used the capital-to-asset ratio as a proxy for bank risk in their studies of Japanese banks. 
Lastly, write-offs for loan losses could be used as another measure of bank risk (Gorton 
and Rosen, 1995). We also used the variable jtCAP  as a dependent variable for bank risk 
in Korea and Japan, and report the results of estimations thus derived. In addition, we 
employed the ratio of write-offs to total assets as a dependent variable representing risk 
appetite in Japanese banks.8  
 
The final control variable is jtFA , the fixed asset ratio (i.e., the ratio of property, 
plant, and equipment to total assets) of the thj bank at time t. It should be positively 
related to the risk measures because fixed assets serve as a measure of both operating 
leverage and liquidity of the asset portfolio. Year dummy variables were included in 
order to capture year- specific characteristics. 
Return on assets (ROA) was also used as an independent variable in a separate 
model in order to analyze the effects of insider ownership and franchise value on the 
profitability of banks. The banking system differs between the two countries. For 
example, keiretsu banks in Japan extract rents from their client firms (Weinstein and 
Yafeh, 1998) in exchange for maintaining close relationships with them. These banks 
pressure their client firms to maintain high levels of bank debt at high interest rates. 
Therefore, they are likely to be more profitable than other types of banks. To see whether 
this affects the ROA for Japanese banks, we included an additional equation with a 
keiretsu dummy variable for Japanese banks. 
 
2. Data 
We used panel data on commercial banks from the relatively regulated periods of 1997 
to 2005 for Korea and 1996 to 2006 for Japan. Since bank risks are measured by capital 
market risk, sample banks should be listed on a stock exchange. The number of listed 
banks varies greatly during the sample periods because the banking sectors were 
undergoing financial restructuring, and merged banks are treated as new banks. Table 1 
shows the number of banks surveyed per year. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Our panel is unbalanced, and the estimations could be biased by the selection of 
only surviving banks. This is because riskier banks presumably drop out of the sample on 
a more frequent basis. Further, new entrants may assume different risk-taking behaviors 
from existing banks. It is widely recognized that, when this is the case, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimates suffer from selection bias. Therefore, we apply a two-step 
Heckman procedure (Heckman, 1979) and calculate the Mills ratio to check the survival 
bias in our sample. The results are reported in the Appendix.9 
Data on Korean stock market returns were obtained from the Korea Stock 
Research Institute (KSRI). Data on managerial ownership and large block holders were 
acquired from the database of the Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA) and the 
annual reports of individual banks. Balance sheet data and equity market value were both 
secured from the Fnguide10 database and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS).11 
Japanese stock market data (i.e., the Tokyo stock market index and the stock 
prices of individual banks) were procured from FinancialQuest, the online database of the 
Japanese business newspaper publisher NIKKEI, while ownership data were from 
Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters. The financial data on commercial banks are from the 
“Kaisha Zaimu Karte” of the Tokyo Keizai Shimpo. Table 2 shows the list of variables 
and their description. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
V. Empirical Results 
 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of the Korean banking sector, 
which covers the years of 1997 to 2005. It shows that the level of total risk, measured as 
the standard deviation of weekly stock return series, is 10.22 percent, and that the mean 
level of unsystematic risk, measured as the standard deviation of the residuals of the 
index model, is 8.70 percent. It also reveals that the mean market beta, while positive, 
equals less than one. Additionally, the average level of officer and director ownership is 
0.25 percent, with a standard deviation of 0.65 percent, and a maximum share of 3.84 
percent. In comparison, the mean average of ownership by external block holders is 35.45 
percent. At 0.99, our measure of franchise value falls just below one. This means that, on 
average, the market value of assets is 0.08 percent smaller than the book value of assets 
for the banks in the sample. The standard deviation of 0.03 reveals some dispersion in 
franchise values, but most sample banks have franchise values approximating the average. 
The mean value of log of total asset is 23.75, and the average capital-to-asset 
ratio for the banks in the sample is 4.28 percent. The fixed-asset-to-total asset ratio has an 
average of 3.28 percent, with maximum and minimum values of 7.91 percent and 1.28 
percent, respectively. The ROA mean is 7.81 percent, with a standard deviation of 2.76 
percent. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
Table 4 describes the statistics for the sample of the Japanese banking sector, which 
covers the years of 1996 to 2006. It shows that the level of total risk, measured as the 
standard deviation of weekly stock return series, is 1.84 percent. This is lower than the 
total risk level of Korean banks. Further, the mean level of unsystematic risk is also lower 
than in the Korean data. The average level of insider ownership is 0.89 percent, with a 
standard deviation of 1.32 percent. Generally, insider ownership ratios are high for local 
banks and low for banks with headquarters in the metropolitan area. The Japanese banks 
have a mean franchise value of one, which is as high as that of the Korean banks. The 
mean value of the log of total asset is 14.67,while the average capital adequacy ratio and 
average fixed assets ratio divided by total asset ratio is 4.62 percent and 1.68 percent, 
respectively. ROA mean has a negative value of 0.09 percent. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
2. Empirical Results for Korea 
Table 5 shows the estimations for the relationship between managerial ownership 
and bank risk in Korea, which use various measures of bank risks as dependent variables. 
Managerial ownership and franchise value are included in the model with the interaction 
term. In cases where the Hausman specification test rejected the random effects model, 
the estimations of the fixed effects model are reported in its stead. We applied the two-
step Heckman procedure to correct the sample bias in the model, and present the results 
in Appendix I. When total and unsystematic risk are used as dependent variables, the 
parameters estimated by the OLS method and the Heckman procedure are similar, and the 
Mills ratio is very small and insignificant. This implies that there is no sample bias in the 
model. 
The sample period in this analysis is the late 1990s and early 2000s, which was a 
relatively regulated time. Previous literature suggests that ownership structure has a much 
stronger effect on the risk characteristics of banks during periods of deregulation than it 
does during periods of regulation. Managerial ownership, Inside, when controlled for 
franchise value, affects only one of the three risk measures—systematic risk. This is 
shown by the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the square of managerial 
ownership, , in the systematic risk model. Similarly, franchise value, Qratio(-1), 
affects only systematic risk when controlled for managerial ownership. 
However, when the coefficients of the interaction term, Qratio(-1)*Inside, are 
estimated, the results obtained are consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis. These 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant at 10 percent for all the risk 
measures used as dependent variables. This implies that increases in managerial 
ownership at banks with high franchise value curb risk-taking behavior and reduce levels 
2Inside
of risk. This is because the costs of bank failure can be dear for the owners of banks with 
high franchise values, who have much to lose if a risky business strategy leads to 
insolvency. As a result, the aforementioned increases strengthen their incentive to operate 
safely, thereby aligning their interests with those of deposit insurers and bank supervisors. 
The result concurs with previous literature confirming the disciplinary role of 
franchise value on bank risk-taking. It also accords with existing analyses of Korean 
cases by Lee (2004, 2005-2006), which state that banks in positions of greater moral 
hazard tend to have more incentive to align their interests with those of stockholders, and 
are therefore inclined to take on more risk as managerial ownership increases. 
The coefficient of Outside, which is the percentage of shares held by external 
block holders, is significant when total risk and systematic risk are used as dependent 
variables. This implies that large external owners affect the managerial decisions and the 
risk-taking behavior of banks. In the Korean banking sector in general, larger assets entail 
greater amounts of risk. However, large banks are able to diversify, leading to lower risk, 
and the “too big to fail” notion may also to reduce bank risk. According to Oh et al. 
(2003) and Park and Park (2007), increases in asset size negatively affect the stability of 
Korean banks. In our estimation, the larger the asset size, the greater the systematic risk. 
This is consistent with previous research and the “too big to fail” doctrine. Our results 
also show that the capital-to-asset ratio does not significantly affect the risk level of 
banks. As expected, the fixed asset ratio increases the levels of total risk and 
unsystematic risk in the model. Finally, the positive and statistically significant 
coefficients of the yearly dummy variables for the years of 1997 to 2002 reflect the 
unfavorable banking environment engendered by high levels of risk. 
Table 6 examines the relationship between managerial ownership and ROA, 
which acts as a proxy for banking profitability. The variables Inside and 2Inside
 
do not 
affect bank profits to a significant degree. Thus, managerial ownership affects neither 
bank risk as examined in Table 5, nor banking profitability as examined after controlling 
for franchise value. Contrary to our expectations, franchise value reduces banks profit 
after it is controlled for managerial ownership. Conversely, the interaction term between 
managerial ownership and franchise value does not influence bank profits. Elsewhere, the 
capital-to-asset ratio positively affects banking profitability, while the fixed asset ratio 
sways it in a negative direction. The negative and significant coefficients of the dummy 
variables for the years of 1997 to 2000 reflect the unfavorable banking environment of 
the time. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
Table 6 here 
 
3. Empirical Results for Japan 
Table 7 presents the estimations for Japan. As for Korea, the estimations of the 
fixed effects models are presented in cases where the Hausman specification test rejected 
the random effects model. In addition, the two-step Heckman procedure was 
administered to correct the sample bias in the Japanese banking industry, and the results 
are presented in Appendix II. When all three risk measures are used as dependent 
variables, the parameters estimated by the OLS method and the Heckman procedure are 
similar, and the Mills ratio is very small and insignificant. These results imply that the 
model contains no sample bias. 
After controlling for the influence of franchise value, the model analyzes 
increases in managerial ownership for their propensity to increase total risk. It finds that 
managerial ownership does not affect levels of unsystematic or systematic risk. However, 
franchise value reduces both types of risk. In particular, its role in reducing levels of 
systematic risk maintains a one percent significance level. The coefficients of the 
interaction term for franchise value and managerial ownership are negative and 
significant, maintaining a five percent significance level for total risk and a one percent 
significance level for unsystematic and systematic risk. These results confirm that 
franchise value disciplines risk-taking behavior in the Japanese banking industry, just as 
it does in the Korean banking industry. 
The estimations show that external block holders of Japanese banks do not affect 
risk levels. This falls in with the predictions of the information asymmetry hypothesis. 
Asset size particularly increases levels of total risk, thereby supporting the notion of “too 
big to fail.” The results also confirm that total risk falls as the capital-to-asset ratio rises, 
and that the parameters of the ratio of write-offs to assets are entirely insignificant, 
probably because the variable excludes bad loans from write-off expenses. 
Table 8 shows the estimations that use ROA as a proxy for banking profitability, 
which is then used as a dependent variable. By regressing the independent variables in 
profit calculations, we can examine the corporate control hypothesis, which states that 
increased risk-taking behavior resulting from an increase in managerial ownership should 
produce larger profits. However, increases in total risk resulting from increased 
managerial ownership do not lead to higher profits for Japanese banks. This result is 
commonly obtained when the keiretsu dummies are added. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
Table 8 here 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Bank stockholders have greater incentives and abilities to increase risk in 
deregulated environments than they do in tightly regulated ones. This is documented by 
the existing literature, which demonstrates that ownership structure tends to have much a 
stronger effect on the levels of risk taken by banks during deregulated periods than it does 
during regulated ones. Our study contributes to the literature by analyzing the effect of 
managerial ownership on the risk-taking behavior of banks in the Korean and Japanese 
banking industries during the relatively regulated period of the late 1990s to early 2000s. 
We experiment with a model that includes the variables of managerial ownership and 
franchise value, which are used to produce an interaction term. 
Managerial ownership affects neither the risk levels nor the profit levels of 
Korean banks. In contrast, increases in managerial ownership heighten the total risks of 
Japanese banks. However, this increase in risk does not produce higher profits for 
Japanese banks. 
When the coefficients of the interaction term between franchise value and 
managerial ownership are estimated, we obtain results that are consistent with the moral 
hazard hypothesis. These coefficients are negative and statistically significant when all 
three risk measures are used as dependent variables for both the Korean and the Japanese 
banking industries. This indicates that increases in managerial ownership at banks with 
high franchise values discourage risk-taking behavior. 
The costs of bank failure can be high for the owners of banks with high 
franchise values because these owners have much to lose if risky strategies lead to 
insolvency. Therefore, banks with high franchise values are motivated to operate safely, 
and this aligns their interests with those of deposit insurers and bank supervisors. Our 
estimations correspond to the results detailed in previous literature, which has established 
the disciplinary role of franchise value on the risk-taking behavior of banks. While the 
origins or trends of franchise value may differ in Korea and Japan, its role in curbing the 
risk-taking incentives of banks is uniform across both countries. 
Existing literature on the relationship between managerial ownership and risk-
taking behavior mostly focuses on the U.S. banking system. Our results show that 
theories derived from market-based systems such as the U.S. economy can be applied to 
other types of financial systems, such as the bank-based economies of Korea and Japan. 
Our findings may be enhanced by future studies covering a wider range of international 
panel data. An examination of the post-1990s period would be especially enlightening 
because a large number of developed and emerging countries have experienced financial 
deregulation and reregulation since that time. 
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<Table 1> Number of Sample Commercial Banks Analyzed Over the Years 
year Number of banks analyzed 
Korea Japan 
1996 - 74 
1997 25 77 
1998 25 79 
1999 18 82 
2000 15 78 
2001 14 79 
2002 11 82 
2003 11 84 
2004 10 86 
2005 9 87 
2006 - 87 
 
<Table 2> List of the Variables 
Variables Description 
Risk    
sσ  
-Total risk, standard deviation of the weekly return on each bank’s stock 
s
εσ  
-Unsystematic risk, standard deviation of the residual error term from index model 
s
MKβ
 
-Market beta representing systematic risk, coefficient on the market portfolio return 
WOF -Write-off-to-asset ratio 
Inside 
Outside 
-Managerial ownership, percentage of equity held by managers and directors 
- Shares of outside block holders 
Qratio -Franchise value, proxied by Tobin’s q measured as the sum of market value of common 
equity plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of asset 
LTA 
CAP 
FA 
Dum 
-Log of total asset 
-Financial leverage, capital-to-asset ratio(share holder’s equity/total asset) 
-Operating leverage, fixed asset to total asset 
-Yearly dummy variables 
ROA -Profit proxied by ROA 
<Table 3> Descriptive Statistics for Korean Banking Industry 
 mean median s.d. max min 
Risk 
 
sσ (%) 
10.22 9.09 5.30 29.00 2.00 
s
εσ (%) 
8.70 7.24 4.91 2.69 1.63 
s
MKβ  
0.95 0.97 0.43 2.10 -0.08 
Inside (%) 
Outside (%) 
Qratio (%) 
LTA 
CAP (%) 
FA (%) 
ROA (%) 
0.25 
35.45 
0.99 
23.75 
4.28 
3.28 
7.81 
0.02 
15.1 
0.99 
23.99 
4.00 
2.99 
0.26 
0.65 
35.17 
0.03 
1.27 
1.73 
1.29 
2.76 
3.84 
123.62 
1.07 
25.94 
9.00 
7.91 
3.1 
0.00 
1.17 
0.95 
21.05 
-6.00 
1.28 
-11.45 
 
<Table 4> Descriptive Statistics for Japanese Banking Industry 
 mean median s.d. max min 
Risk 
 
sσ (%) 
1.84 1.80 0.80 6.50 0.00 
s
εσ (%) 
0.15 0.10 0.00 0.90 0.10 
s
MKβ  
0.13 0.03 0.25 1.81 0.00 
WOF(%) 0.13 0.63 0.02 14.81 0.00 
Inside (%) 
Outside (%) 
Qratio (%) 
LTA 
CAP (%) 
FA (%) 
ROA (%) 
0.89 
52.27 
1.00 
14.67 
4.62 
1.68 
-0.09 
0.24 
50.98 
1.00 
14.61 
4.50 
1.60 
0.12 
1.32 
14.76 
0.02 
0.97 
1.35 
0.70 
3.20 
10.68 
99.41 
1.23 
19.05 
12.80 
4.70 
7.60 
0.00 
3.50 
0.96 
12.65 
0.00 
0.20 
-52.10 
<Table 5> Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Bank’ Risk: Korean Case 
Dependent variable Total Risk 
( sσ ) 
Unsystematic 
Risk 
( sεσ ) 
Systematic Risk 
 ( sMKβ ) 
Capital 
(CAP) 
Random Effect Fixed Effect Random Effect Fixed Effect 
c    
 
Inside 
 
2Inside  
 
Outside 
 
Qratio(-1) 
 
Qratio(-1)*Inside 
 
LTA 
 
CAP 
 
FA 
 
Year dummies 
0.080 
(0.575) 
0.002 
(0.916) 
-0.004 
(0.184) 
0.031*** 
(0.00) 
-0.081 
(0.574) 
-0.041* 
(0.098) 
0.001 
(0.589) 
-0.227 
(0.176) 
0.749*** 
(0.006) 
yes 
-0.192 
(0.721) 
-0.004 
(0.915) 
-0.010** 
(0.023) 
0.025 
(0.171) 
0.076 
(0.681) 
-0.038* 
(0.090) 
0.006 
(0.781) 
-0.210 
(0.358) 
1.047* 
(0.068) 
yes 
1.396 
(0.409) 
-0.275 
(0.307) 
0.017 
(0.639) 
0.203* 
(0.067) 
-3.125* 
(0.068) 
-0.220* 
(0.079) 
0.116*** 
(0.000) 
-0.466 
(0.814) 
4.810 
(0.196) 
yes 
0.259 
(0.391) 
0.420 
(0.246) 
0.002 
(0.360) 
-0.019** 
(0.022) 
0.077 
(0.393) 
-0.437 
(0.237) 
-0.012 
(0.299) 
 
 
0.547 
(0.121) 
yes 
R-squared
 
F Statistic 
Wald Chi^2 
Hausman Specification Test 
Breusch Pagan LM Test 
Observations 
Firms
 
0.76 
 
286.390*** 
12.310 
4.260*** 
106 
26 
0.67 
12.950*** 
 
186.700*** 
0.130 
106 
26 
0.59 
 
127.580*** 
7.840 
4.470** 
106 
26 
0.84 
 
 
77.75*** 
1.110 
85 
19 
Note: ( ) represents p-value.  
*** represents the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level 
     
  
<Table 6> Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Bank’ Profit: Korean Case 
 
ROA 
Fixed Effect 
c    
 
Inside 
 
2Inside  
 
Outside 
 
Qratio(-1) 
 
Qratio(-1)*Inside 
 
LTA 
 
CAP 
 
FA 
 
Year Dummies 
0.180* 
(0.077) 
0.009 
(0.517) 
0.000 
(0.896) 
-0.014* 
(0.066) 
-0.222** 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.599) 
0.002 
(0.440) 
0.468*** 
(0.000) 
-0.517** 
(0.020) 
Yes 
R-squared
 
F Statistic 
Wald Chi^2 
Hausman Specification Test 
Breusch Pagan LM Test 
Observations 
Firms
 
0.73 
11.800*** 
 
27.490* 
2.050 
104 
26 
Note: ( ) represents p-value.  
*** represents the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level 
<Table 7> Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Bank’ Risk: Japanese Case 
 Total Risk 
( sσ ) 
Unsystema
tic Risk 
( sεσ ) 
Systematic 
Risk 
 ( sMKβ ) 
Capital 
(CAP) 
Write-off 
(WOF) 
Random 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
Fixed Effect Random 
Effect 
Random 
Effect 
c    
 
Inside 
 
2Inside  
 
Outside 
 
Qratio(-1) 
 
Qratio(-1)*Inside 
 
LTA 
 
CAP 
 
FA 
 
Years Dummies 
-0.007 
(0.740) 
1.794** 
(0.019) 
-0.563 
(0.730) 
0.000 
(0.882) 
-0.005 
(0.787) 
-1.769** 
(0.022) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.141*** 
(0.000) 
0.036 
(0.533) 
Yes 
-0.003 
(0.228) 
0.142 
(0.188) 
0.051 
(0.789) 
0.000 
(0.231) 
0.005* 
(0.097) 
-0.146* 
(0.078) 
0.000 
(0.174) 
-0.005 
(0.113) 
-0.008 
(0.210) 
Yes 
0.581 
(0.238) 
8.549 
(0.234) 
-12.165 
(0.546) 
-0.013 
(0.749) 
-0.604*** 
(0.000) 
-8.183* 
(0.086) 
-0.004 
(0.892) 
-0.461 
(0.198) 
0.745 
(0.319) 
Yes 
0.081*** 
(2.830) 
-1.042 
(-1.050) 
1.562 
(0.710) 
0.003 
(0.650) 
-0.035 
(-1.430) 
0.984 
(0.990) 
0.003 
(0.410) 
 
 
0.460*** 
(6.520) 
Yes 
0.006 
(1.020) 
-0.131 
(-0.570) 
-0.396 
(-0.910) 
-0.001 
(-0.310) 
-0.008 
(-1.420) 
-0.007 
(-1.420) 
0.001* 
(1.870) 
 
 
-0.021 
(-1.580) 
Yes 
R-squared
 
F Statistic 
Wald Chi^2 
Hausman 
Specification Test 
Breusch Pagan 
LM Test 
Observations 
Firms
 
0.19 
 
122.590*** 
11.760 
 
433.320*** 
 
706 
86 
0.09 
 
47.100*** 
19.620 
 
27.200*** 
 
578 
87 
0.23 
18.840*** 
 
30.370*** 
 
0.170 
 
844 
86 
0.21 
 
604.15*** 
2.160 
 
1024.5*** 
 
790 
87 
0.20 
 
221.87*** 
11.112 
 
49.49*** 
 
790 
87 
Note: ( ) represents p-value.  
*** represents the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level 
Variables “Dropped” due to collinearity problem 
 
 
<Table 8> Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Bank’ Profit: Japanese Case 
 ROA ROA 
Random Effect Random Effect 
c    
 
Inside 
 
2Inside  
 
Outside 
 
Qratio(-1) 
 
Qratio(-1)*Inside 
 
LTA 
 
CAP 
 
FA 
 
Keiretsus dummies 
Year Dummies 
-0.003*** 
(-0.190) 
-1.077* 
(1.920) 
1.818 
(1.560) 
-0.002 
(-0.150) 
-0.003 
(-0.200) 
1.005* 
(1.780) 
-0.002 
(-1.080) 
0.228*** 
(12.730) 
-0.035 
(-0.990) 
No 
Yes 
-0.015 
(-1.160) 
-1.117** 
(-2.020) 
1.769 
(1.600) 
-0.004 
(-0.320) 
0.003 
(0.280) 
1.047* 
(1.880) 
0.002 
(0.920) 
0.209*** 
(12.300) 
-0.028 
(-0.870) 
Yes 
Yes 
R-squared
 
F Statistic 
Wald Chi^2 
Hausman Specification Test 
Breusch Pagan LM Test 
Observations 
Firms
 
0.26 
 
260.200*** 
10.210 
18.990*** 
722 
87 
0.29 
 
286.490*** 
14.140 
2.96* 
722 
87 
Note: ( ) represents p-value.  
*** represents the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level and *at 10% level 
Variables “Dropped” due to collinearity problem 
<Appendix I> Heckman Two-step Estimation Results: Korean Case 
Dependent variable Total Risk 
( sσ ) 
Unsystematic Risk 
( sεσ ) 
Systematic Risk 
 ( sMKβ ) 
OLS 
Estimates 
Heckman 
Two-step 
Estimates 
OLS 
Estimates 
Heckman 
Two-step 
Estimates 
OLS 
Estimates 
Heckman 
Two-step 
Estimates 
c    
 
Inside 
 
2Inside  
 
Outside 
 
Qratio(-1) 
 
Qratio(-1*) Inside 
 
FA 
 
Indugro 
 
Yearly 
Dummy 
-0.027 
(0.828) 
0.004 
(0.854) 
-0.004 
(0.166) 
0.028*** 
(0.001) 
0.037 
(0.749) 
0.010 
(0.574) 
0.816*** 
(0.000) 
dropped 
 
yes 
 
0.088 
(0.552) 
0.002 
(0.944) 
0.013 
(0.332) 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
-0.741 
(0.629) 
0.008 
(0.679) 
0.148 
(0.672) 
0.095 
(0.623) 
yes 
 
-0.087 
(0.472) 
0.157 
(0.466) 
-0.006** 
(0.045) 
0.027*** 
(0.001) 
0.088 
(0.445) 
0.006 
(0.708) 
0.850*** 
(0.000) 
dropped 
 
yes 
 
0.014 
(0.921) 
0.016 
(0.571) 
0.016 
(0.210) 
0.045*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.995) 
0.001 
(0.963) 
0.109 
(0.750) 
0.074 
(0.696) 
yes 
 
2.166 
(0.180) 
-0.304 
(0.290) 
0.028 
(0.486) 
0.292** 
(0.007) 
-1.106 
(0.469) 
0.182 
(0.424) 
-2.027 
(0.498) 
dropped 
 
yes 
 
5.175 
(0.215) 
-0.240 
(0.783) 
-0.126 
(0.737) 
0.014 
(0.956) 
-5.254 
(0.222) 
0.139 
(0.810) 
7.457 
(0.471) 
6.875 
(0.220) 
yes 
 
R-squared
 
Observations 
Mills ratio
 
 
0.778 
115 
 
 
 
121 
0.009 
(0.429) 
0.739 
117 
 
 
 
121 
-0.004 
(0.706) 
0.485 
117 
 
 
 
121 
0.762** 
(0.023) 
Note: ( ) represents p-value.  
*** represents the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level 
Variables “Dropped” due to collinearity problem 
 
 
<Appendix II> Heckman Two-step Estimation Results: Japanese Case 
Dependent variable Total Risk 
( sσ ) 
Unsystematic Risk 
( sεσ ) 
Systematic Risk 
 ( sMKβ ) 
OLS 
Estimates 
Heckman 
Two-step 
Estimates 
OLS 
Estimates 
Heckman 
Two-step 
Estimates 
OLS 
Estimates 
Heckman 
Two-step 
Estimates 
c 
 
Inside 
 
2Inside  
 
Outside 
 
Qratio(-1) 
 
Qratio(-1*) Inside 
 
FA 
 
Indugro 
 
Yearly 
Dummy 
0.030* 
(0.091) 
-0.041 
(0.959) 
-2.630 
(0.113) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009 
(0.593) 
0.185 
(0.816) 
-0.260*** 
(0.000) 
0.043 
(0.177) 
yes 
 
0.040 
(0.963) 
-0.352 
(0.993) 
-1.180 
(0.989) 
-0.005 
(0.956) 
-0.021 
(0.980) 
0.415 
(0.992) 
-0.102 
(0.964) 
0.050 
(0.974) 
yes 
 
-0.000 
(0.799) 
0.095 
(0.262) 
-0.029 
(0.874) 
-0.000** 
(0.060) 
0.002 
(0.235) 
-0.096 
(0.261) 
-0.011** 
(0.033) 
0.000 
(0.911) 
yes 
 
-0.000 
(0.929) 
0.094 
(0.636) 
-0.023 
(0.957) 
-0.000 
(0.441) 
0.002 
(0.629) 
-0.095 
(0.633) 
-0.011 
(0.413) 
0.000 
(0.961) 
yes 
 
-0.115 
(0.427) 
5.484 
(0.403) 
-6.936 
(0.609) 
0.010 
(0.018) 
0.133 
(0.335) 
-5.366 
(0.412) 
-0.000 
(0.998) 
-0.838*** 
(0.002) 
yes 
 
-0.125 
(0.872) 
5.780 
(0.870) 
-8.252 
(0.910) 
0.009 
(0.909) 
0.145 
(0.846) 
-5.588 
(0.874) 
-0.144 
(0.944) 
-0.844 
(0.550) 
yes 
 
R-squared
 
Observations 
Mills ratio
 
 
0.120 
826 
 
 
 
827 
-0.360 
(0.865) 
0.072 
662 
 
 
 
663 
-0.002 
(0.786) 
0.082 
822 
 
 
 
823 
0.320 
(0.557) 
Note: ( ) represents p-value.  
*** represents the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level 
Variables “Dropped” due to collinearity problem 
 
Endnotes: 
                                                 
1
 The convoy banking system originated in the desire of Japanese bank regulators to prioritize 
financial stability over all else in the design of their regulatory regime. This system constrained 
all the banks within it to grow at the same pace, in a manner similar to how ships in a convoy are 
required to move at the pace of their slowest member. In addition, the convoy rescue system 
placed the burden of resolving bank failures on the banking system itself. Instead of liquidating 
failing banks through a deposit insurance regime, regulators merged it with a healthy bank. This 
“convoy approach” may have played a role in the system’s poor performance. 
 
2
 In early 1998, the Korea First Bank and the Seoul Bank were offered to foreign investors 
through an agreement with IMF. Five ailing banks were merged with healthy banks through P&A 
procedures. In 1999, the Commercial Bank of Korea and Hanil Bank were merged to become 
Hanvit Bank, while Boram Bank was merged with Hana Bank. In 2001, four banks that had 
received public funds, (Hanvit Bank, Kwangju Bank, Kyungnam Bank, and the Peace Bank) were 
consolidated into Korea’s first financial holding company, the Woori Financial Holding Company. 
As well, Kookmin Bank and the Korean Housing Bank were merged. In December 2002, Hana 
Bank and the Seoul Bank were merged. In 2003, the nationalized Chonhung Bank was sold to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Shinhan Financial Holding Company. 
 
3
 The bank merger wave in the Japanese metropolitan area was triggered by repeated bankruptcies 
and a series of financial reforms in the 1990s. As of September 2006, the number of banks in 
Japan’s metropolitan area was reduced to approximately three financial holding firms, namely, 
Mitsubishi Tokyo UFJ Financial Holdings, Mitsui Sumitomo Banking Corporation, and Mizuho 
Financial Holdings. This was not the case in the regional banking market, with the number of 
banks in local areas totaling 129. On average, the number of regional bank branches decreased by 
1.1 percent per annum from 1992 to 2006. As the number of bank mergers increased, the top 
three banks’ share of deposits grew, reaching 40.5 percent in 2005 as compared with 26 percent 
in 1991. 
 
4
 In our examination of the relation between risk and ownership, we treat risk as a dependent 
variable and ownership variable as an independent variable, rather than the other way around. 
However, it is important to note that individual perspectives on the relation between bank risk and 
ownership differ, as Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) point out. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
and Grossman and Hart (1986) state that ownership is endogenous (i.e., dependent on firm-
specific factors). Some firms (e.g., riskier ones) need monitoring owners. Therefore, papers that 
study ownership monitoring have treated ownership structure as a dependent variable (see e.g., 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; La Porta et al., 1998; Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan, 1999). 
 
5
 Outside for Korea represents the share of stock held by a bank’s largest shareholder, and 
includes the share owned by the related families and subsidiaries of this company. 
 
6
 In testing the substitution hypothesis, papers have done one of the following: (1) contrasted 
periods before and/or after a change in the regulatory environment (e.g., Kole and Lehn, 1999; 
Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Konishi and Yasudat, 2004); (2) contrasted firms in regulated 
industries with firms in non-regulated industries (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Booth et al., 
2002); or (3) contrasted the internal governance of firms from countries with different regulatory 
environments (La Porta et al., 1998; Caprio et al., 2003). 
 
7
 Franchise value can be used to represent future growth opportunity, which usually depends 
largely upon the risk-taking behavior of individual banks. This is because future profitability and 
its volatility is significantly related to risk-taking behavior, as suggested in financial engineering 
literature. However, we look at whether past franchise value has an inverse effect on risk-taking 
behavior. 
 
8
 We appreciate comments from anonymous referees on this point. We used the equity-to-asset 
ratio as a dependent variable in estimations for both countries. As Sharpe (1994) contends, most 
studies are unable to use write-offs for loan losses as a measure of bank risk due to the 
unavailability of such data. Due to limitations on data regarding write-offs for Korean banks, we 
only use write-offs as a dependent variable for Japanese banks in this paper. 
 
9
 The survival bias (the sample selection problem) is extensively dealt with in firm-related 
literature by authors such as Karlsson et al. (2009) and Alvarez and Gorg (2007). 
 
10
 The website of Fnguide can be accessed at http://www.fnguide.co.kr. 
 
11
 The website of the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) can be accessed at http://fisis.fss.or.kr. 
